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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses a puzzle in the UK labour market. Why is not there
enough investment in job training when there is a high skill premium? We
model this as a coordination game between firms and workers. Using a
social planning model as a baseline, the paper demonstrates that while it is
socially beneficial to invest in job training, the private sector may fail to
internalize these benefits in a wide range of economies. The chance of this
coordination failure is greater in economies with a higher inequality in the
skill distribution and a higher rate of time preference.
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discliamer applies.1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate about the skill gap in the UK labour market. Vacancies remain
un￿lled because of this skill shortage. Haskel and Martin (2001) document that the skill
shortage is greater for ￿rms employing advanced technology. In an illuminating skill
survey, Felstead, Gallie and Green (2002) document two apparently con￿ icting features of
the UK labour market. First, there is an excess supply of intermediate skills. 1 Second,
since 1986, more jobs require advanced skill. A substantial skill premium exists at the
graduate level (57% for women and 38% for men) compared with jobs which require no
quali￿cation. The recent work of Jenkins, Greenwood and Vignole (2007) also con￿rm
this skill premium di⁄erential. Jenkins et al. con￿rm that the level 2 workers actually
su⁄er a wage penalty compared to workers with no quali￿cations.
These two ￿ndings are puzzling. If there is such a high skill premium, why is not this
exploited by the workers? If a large number of high-skilled, well paid jobs are vacant,
why don￿ t the workers invest in job training and reap the bene￿ts? Instead workers are
content to acquire lesser intermediate quali￿cations and create a glut of intermediate skills
in the labour market. A related question also arises: why don￿ t employers take advantage
of this anomaly by employing low-skilled intermediate level workers and turn them into
high-skilled by job training?
The issue of under-investment in job training in the context of labour market search
frictions has been addressed in the literature. Acemoglu (1997) argues that search fric-
tions create training externality and cause under-investment in training due to incomplete
contract between workers and employers. Moen and Rosen (2004) argue that this under-
investment arises because training ￿rms set wages for trained workers at a too low level
compared to the wage o⁄ered by the poaching ￿rms.
In this paper, we approach this issue with a di⁄erent perspective. We argue that
1The follwoing quoatation from Felsstead et al. (2002) aptly summararizes this supply-demand im-
balance: "...there are 6.4 million people quali￿ed to the equivalent of NVQ level 3 in the workforce, but
only 4 million jobs that demand this level of highest quali￿cation. There are a further 5.3 million people
quali￿ed at level 2, but only 3.9 million jobs that require a highest quali￿cation at this lower level."
1this under-investment in training may arise due to strategic considerations in job training
decisions. The job training decision is modelled in terms of a dynamic game between the
worker and the ￿rm instead of a competitive search equilibrium as in Moen and Rosen
(2004). Both worker and ￿rm face the choice whether to invest in job training taking
into account that the other party may or may not invest in training. This strategic
complementarity may give rise to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium where none may invest in
training for a range of training costs. We provide a normative bend to this issue by setting
up a ￿ctitious social planning problem and asking ￿rst whether it is socially e¢ cient to
invest in such job training in a labour market environment where there is search frictions
. The benevolent social planner internalizes the search frictions and dictates whether the
￿rms or households should invest in job training and if so how much training cost each
should bear. Given this social planning model as the baseline, we ask whether there is
enough incentive for the private sector to invest in such a job training. If one ￿nds that
there is no such incentive in a decentralized economy while the social planner mandates
investment in training, it calls for a government intervention in the form of a corrective
tax/subsidy.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we lay out the environment.
Section 3 sets up a model of strategic training. Section 4 describes a social planning model
which is used in section 5 as a baseline for comparing with the decentralized job training
outcome. Section 6 concludes.
2 Environment
Two types of technologies are available: high skill (su¢ xed as s) and low skill (su¢ xed as
u). There are continuum of high-skilled and low-skilled workers and ￿rms in a unit interval.
Initially there are ￿s
0 proportion of high-skilled workers and ￿rms which means that there
is no initial mismatch of skills in the economy. There is also an initial distribution of
vacant high-skilled and low-skilled ￿rms denoted as vs
00 and vu
00 respectively and an initial




There is random matching of vacant ￿rms and unemployed workers in each sector. The
matching processes in the high-skilled and low-skilled sectors are described as follows. At
each date vi
t (i = s;u) proportion of vacant i-type ￿rms meet ui
t proportion of unemployed
i-type workers. Let ￿
i be the probability that an unemployed i-type worker matches a
vacant i-type ￿rm. A match consummates when a vacant ￿rm ￿nds an unemployed










If the ith worker successfully matches with the ith ￿rm (i = s;u),it produces ￿xed
units of output pi where ps > pu: Let a ￿xed fraction ￿i of successful matches die every
period either due to exogenous retirement or layo⁄s or poaching.
There are two types of provisions for job training in the economy: (i) low-skilled worker
undertakes self-training by joining a skill center; (ii) low-skilled ￿rm imparts job training
to a low-skilled worker. If a low-skilled worker goes through (i), he becomes high-skilled
in the next period. If a low-skilled ￿rm undertakes (ii), it turns a low-skilled worker into
high-skilled in the next period and also transforms itself into a high-skilled ￿rm. Since
there is no initial mismatch between high-skilled ￿rms and high-skilled workers, high-
skilled ￿rms do not have any incentive to train workers. The only decision problem for
either the low-skilled worker or the low-skilled ￿rm is whether to invest resources in job




t taking values 0 or




2Such a matching function is known in the literature as a quadratic matching fuynction following
Diamond and Maskin (1979). Such a matching function can be motivated by the illustrative example
borrowed from Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) that both matched and unmatched ￿rms and households
have a telephone book of all matched and unmatched agents on the other end of the market. A quadratic
matching function may give rise to multiple equilibria. In our context, we break such multiplicity by
invoking an initial distribution of skilled and unskilled workers and ￿rms.
3number of the ith types ￿rms and workers respectively respectively.







t : The state transition










































































A few clari￿cation of the terms in the transition equations are in order. The transition
equation (2.2) shows that the number of high-skilled unemployed increases when job
separations occur (￿rst term) or unemployed low-skilled worker after investing in schooling
meets a vacant high-skilled ￿rm but the match does not consummate (second term).
Likewise the number of high-skilled unemployed decreases if a successful match occurs
(third term). Similar explanation applies to (2.3) except that the third term means that the
number of low-skilled workers decreases when an low-skilled worker joins the skill center
and thus withdraws from the pool of low-skilled unemployed and joins the pool of high-
skilled unemployed. The transition equations for vacancies (2.4) and (2.5) basically mean
that the number vacancies in each sector increases if job separations occur and decreases
if a successful match occurs. The transition equation for the high-skilled workers (2.6)
means that more high-skilled workers evolve as more low-skilled ￿rms invest in job training
(the ￿rst term) and more low-skilled worker invests in job training (the second term).
Likewise more high-skilled ￿rms evolve when ￿rms undertake job training programme
and turn themselves into high-skilled, which explains (2.7)
There are four possible steady states for this system: (i)￿rms invest in training while


















t = 0: We focus on the steady state analysis only. First, we pin down the steady
state con￿guration of the six state variables under alternative combinations of training
by ￿rms and households. Using these steady state results, in the next step we pin down
the scenario where neither the employer nor the worker ￿nd it worthwhile investing in
training.
In regard to the ￿rst step, following four lemmas are of interest. Since in the steady
state the relevant state variables do not depend on time but only on state, the subscripts
hereafter now represent the states.





10 (i = s;u) be the steady state solutions of the transition
equation when ￿
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where ￿s = ￿s=￿
s:
Proof. Appendix.





01 (i = s;u) be the steady state solutions of the transition
equation when ￿
f
t = 0 and ￿
w

































11 (i = s;u) be the steady state solutions of the transition
equation when ￿
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Lemma 1 implies that if low-skilled ￿rms alone invest in job training, all low-skilled
workers and ￿rms turn high-skilled in the new steady state. As a consequence, all low-
skilled vacant ￿rms disappear. Lemma 2 means that when low-skilled workers alone invest
in training, they all turn high-skilled while all initial low skilled ￿rms turn vacant in the
new steady state. Lemma 3 means that if both invest in training, both vacant low-skilled
￿rms and unemployed low-skilled workers disappear from the scene. Lemma 4 implies
that if none invest, proportion of low-skilled workers and ￿rms remain the same as the
initial level. The steady state unemployment and vacancy are the same in both sectors
because there is no initial mismatch of skills between workers and the ￿rms.
63 Strategic Training
We now turn our attention to a decentralized environment where the job training decisions
are made in a noncooperative, strategic environment. Let sc be the cost for training a
worker. Let b be a common leisure value of any unemployed worker of any type, c be a
common cost of keeping a production unit vacant and !i be the wage prevailing in the
ith sector. Low-skilled workers while deciding to incur training costs take into account
that even if they do not incur this cost, there is a chance of being hired by a low-skilled
￿rm and getting trained subsequently. A low-skilled ￿rm while contemplating to train
a low-skilled worker internalizes the fact that the same worker may leave the ￿rm after
training. The job training decisions thus appear as the equilibrium of a dynamic game
between workers and ￿rms in a search environment.
The equilibrium of this decentralized economy is formulated in three steps. First,
we specify the value functions of workers and ￿rms. Second, we describe the labour
market story of wage determination. Third, we formulate the noncooperative training
cost thresholds as a Nash equilibrium where neither the ￿rm nor the worker invest in
training.
3.1 Steady State Value Functions: Worker
De￿ne the values of employed and unemployed worker in the ith sector as Ei and Ui
respectively: An employed high-skilled worker can earn a wage !s today and face two
scenarios: (i) stay employed in the next period with a probability (1 ￿ ￿s) or (ii) join
the pool of high-skilled unemployed with probability ￿s and faces the prospect of being
matched with a vacant high-skilled ￿rm with probability ￿
svs: The value functions of the
high-skilled workers are thus:
E
s = !
s + ￿ [￿
sU




s = b + ￿ [￿
sv
sE
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svs (!s ￿ b)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿
svs)
￿
A low-skilled worker likewise faces two scenarios: either to stay unemployed and enjoy
the unemployment bene￿ts b or work at the going market wage !u: However, unlike the
high-skilled worker, he faces a binary decision whether or not to incur private training
cost. This training decision depends on the ￿rm￿ s decision to train workers. If he works
now as low-skilled, in the next period he faces the possibility of either being trained by
the ￿rm, and turn high-skilled or remain untrained. If he does not work now and join the
job center by bearing the training cost, next period he becomes high-skilled and faces the
same value function of a high-skilled worker. If he does not work now and also does not



































3.2 Value Functions: Firm
De￿ne next the values of a matched and vacant ￿rm in the ith sector as Ji and V i
respectively. A high-skilled ￿rm can either get matched with a high-skilled worker or
stay vacant. If it matches, then the ￿rm enjoys a current cash ￿ ow of ps ￿ !s and faces









If it stays vacant, it incurs a vacancy cost c now and faces the prospect of being
matched with an unemployed high-skilled worker next period. This means:
V
s = ￿c + ￿ (￿
su
sJ












￿￿s (ps ￿ !s + c)










sus (ps ￿ !s + c)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿
sus)
A low-skilled matched ￿rm enjoys the current cash ￿ ow of pu ￿ !u; and faces the
decision whether or not to invest in training the incumbent low-skilled worker. If it
decides to train, the ￿rm becomes high-skilled together with the worker and faces the
same value function of a high-skilled ￿rm in the following period. If it does not train its
worker, it stays low-skilled and faces the exogenous uncertainty of separating from the














u + (1 ￿ ￿
u)J
ug]
The value of the low skilled ￿rm does not directly depend on the training strategy
of the worker. The reason is that a low skilled ￿rm can only match with a low skilled
worker. Whether the low skilled worker goes for self training is not directly relevant to the
￿rm. However, as we will see in the next section that when a low skilled worker goes for
self training, it has an impact on his wage and through this channel it impacts the value
of the low skilled ￿rm. This is why the wage of the unskilled worker is state dependent.
If the low-skilled ￿rm remains vacant, it currently incurs the vacancy cost c and faces
the prospect of being matched with a low-skilled worker in the next period. Value of a























If nobody invests in training we get:
V
u (0;0) = ￿c + ￿ (￿
uu
uJ











u(0;0) + (1 ￿ ￿
u)J
u(0;0)g (3.17)
Thus V u(0;0) and Ju(0;0) can be solved from the linear system of equations (3.16)
and (3.17).
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i￿1￿￿ ;i = s;u
where ￿ is a non-negative fraction representing the bargaining strength of the worker.
The solution for wages in the high-skilled sector is:
10!
s = ￿(p
s + c) + (1 ￿ ￿)b
The wage of the high-skilled sector is independent of the unemployment rate or the va-
cancy rate. Therefore the wage of the high-skilled sector is independent of the job training
decisions of ￿rms and workers. This is not the case in the low-skilled sector because the
value functions for low-skilled workers and ￿rms depend on the strategic job training



















w (sc ￿ Us + b))








Based on this, the steady state low skilled wages for the four respective states are
given by:
(0;0) : !u
00 = ￿(pu + c) + (1 ￿ ￿)b
(0;1) : !u
01 = ￿pu + (1 ￿ ￿)((1 ￿ ￿)(Us
01 ￿ scw))
(1;0) : !u
10 = ￿(pu ￿ scf + Js








11 = ￿(pu ￿ scf + Js








10 are obtained from the expressions Js;Us and Es by
replacing the unemployment and vacancy rates with the relevant expressions obtained
from lemma (1, 3 and 2)
3.4 A Nash Equilibrium of no investment in training
Recall that the unemployed low-skilled worker￿ s value Uu in (3.11) is a function of both
￿
f and ￿
w via the Nash bargaining solution for wages. In the appendix we have shown
that the unemployed low-skilled worker￿ s valueUu depends on ￿
f and ￿
w via the Nash
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Observing that Uu(0;1) is monotonically decreasing in sc; it is straightforward to
verify that there exists a threshold training cost scn￿
w for which (3.19) holds as equality.




Using the same line of reasoning, one can establish that there exists a threshold schooling
cost scn￿
f for which (3.20)holds as equality. Given that the worker does not pay, the ￿rm




The appendix provides an algebraic derivation of these two thresholds.
Based on the above analysis we have the following proposition.






neither ￿rm nor the worker ￿nds it worthwhile investing in training.
124 Pareto Optimal Training: A Social Planning Prob-
lem
We next turn into a normative question: is it socially optimal to invest in training? If
so, who should really take charge of job training, ￿rm or worker or both? In order to
answer this question, we set up a ￿ctitious social planning problem. The social planner
internalizes the bene￿ts and costs of keeping a worker unemployed and positions vacant
































t is an indicator function which takes the value unity if the social planner
dictates the ￿rm to spend on job training and zero otherwise, ￿
w
t is such an indicator
function if the planner asks the worker to invest in job training. The social planner












t to maximize the discounted stream of societal bene￿ts: In other words, the
planner￿ s problem is to decide whether it is socially bene￿cial to invest in schooling and
if so, who should undertake this investment and how much he should pay.











st. (2.2) through (2.7).
135 Setting up steady state value function for the social
planner
Given the above four lemmas, it is evident that the state of the economy facing the planner




t ).3 Starting from
this state, the planner can undertake four possible actions by commanding the ￿rms and
the workers as follows: (i) none invest in training (ii) only ￿rms invest in training, (iii)
only workers invest in training, (iv) both invest in training. Given the decision of the
planner, there will be a transition to a new steady state in the next period while the
society will incur a one period transition cost which is the training cost.












































The only initial steady state which is of interest here is when there is no past investment
in training meaning ￿
f
t = 0; and ￿
w
t = 0 because we know from Lemmas 1 through
3 that otherwise everybody is trained to start with and there is no need for schooling.
Starting from this state, planner can mandate four possible actions: (i) no change meaning
￿
f
t+1 = 0; and ￿
w
t+1 = 0;(ii) ask only ￿rms to invest in training, ￿
f
t+1 = 1; and ￿
w
t+1 = 0, (iii)
ask only workers to invest in training, ￿
f
t+1 = 0; and ￿
w
t+1 = 1 and (iv) ask both to invest
in training, ￿
f
t+1 = 1; and ￿
w
t+1 = 1 . The planner chooses the action that gives the best
value (5.24).
3In principle, the entire history of training should comprise the current state facing the planner.
However, given the absorbing nature of the state (meaning when either the worker or the ￿rm invests
in training, an unskilled worker or ￿rm turns permanently skilled next period), the current state is thus
summarised only by the current state if job training.
14From the previous lemmas the steady state values of the returns to the social planner
are given as:
Lemma 5 1. r(1;0) = ps(1 ￿ us
10) + (b ￿ c)us
10




3. r(1;1) = ps(1 ￿ us






00) + (b ￿ c)ui
00]
The following lemma is self-evident.
Lemma 6 De￿ne rmax = max(r(0;0);r(0;1);r(1;0);r(1;1)) and the total schooling cost
as
￿
















max ￿ r(0;0)] (5.26)
The right hand side of (5.26) is the annuity value of the return di⁄erential when the
planner initiates a change from no training to positive training. However, this inequality
is not too informative because we do not yet know the precise restrictions on the structural
parameters for which the planner aspires such a change and we also do not know the value
of rmax: The following lemmas answer these questions.
Lemma 7 : There exists a range of ￿u such that r(0;0) < min(r(1;0);(1;1);r(0;1)):
15Proof: To prove this observe from Lemma 5 that none of r(1;0);(1;1);r(0;1) depends
on ￿u and based on (4) r(0;0) depends on ￿u via uu
00. Thus there exists at least one ￿u
for which r(0;0) < min(r(1;0);(1;1);r(0;1))==
Given that the condition for social planner￿ s intervention holds, the next question is:
who pays for job training. The following lemma describes a range of initial distribution
of skill for which the social planner dictates that the worker should pay for job training.
This is formalized in terms of the following lemma.
Lemma 8 : There exists a range of ￿s
0 such that rmax = r(0;1):
Proof: Observe from lemma (5) and lemmas (1) through (3) that only r(0;1) depends
on ￿s
0: Thus one can always ￿nd a set of ￿s
0 for which r(0;1) = rmax: //
Lemma 9 : For r(0;1) 6= rmax, the planner is indi⁄erent whether worker or ￿rm pays.
Proof: Observe from Lemma (5) and Lemma (1) and Lemma (3) that r(1;0) = r(1;1):
Thus if r(0;1) 6= rmax; then rmax = r(1;0) = r(1;1): The planner is thus indi⁄erent who
pays. ==
Whether it is socially optimal for either the worker or the ￿rm to invest in job train-
ing thus critically depends on the degree of labour market friction (￿u), and the initial
distribution of skill (￿s
0 ).
5.1 Market Failure in Training: Some Quantitative Analysis
We now turn to the key question. Is it privately optimal for either the worker or the ￿rm
to pay for schooling when it is deemed socially optimal that at least one of them should
pay? We do the following conceptual experiment. First, construct sample economies
characterized by the initial distribution of skills and the labour market frictions such that
the social planner intervenes. In other words, we restrict ourselves to sample economies
16for which it is socially optimal to invest in job training. We then ask the question whether
it is privately optimal to invest in training. In order to accomplish this task, we highlight
the following two scenarios:
(i) where the social planner mandates that at least one of the two parties should pay
for training but in a Nash equilibrium as depicted in Proposition (1) nobody ￿nds it
privately optimal to pay because (3.23) holds.
(ii) where the social planner mandates that the worker should pay for training but the
worker does not ￿nd it privately optimal because (3.21) holds.




izing the economy. For brevity, denote this by a (11 ￿ 1) parameter vector ￿. Since
many of these structural parameters are quite non-standard, it is di¢ cult to obtain esti-
mates of these from micro studies. Calibration of the model parameters is, therefore, not
a viable option. Instead of calibration, we resort to simulation to assess the comparative
statics and probabilistic importance of market failure in light of our model. One of the
main criticisms of calibration is that it does not adequately model uncertainty since we do
not include the distributional properties of the micro parameters. Hansen and Heckman
(1996) provides a useful review of the comparison between calibration and simulation of
complex models.
We perform the following design of experiment. Fix ￿ = 0:96; and make random
draws for the proportion parameters (￿s
0;￿
s;￿
u;￿s;￿u;￿) independently from a hyper-
rectangular uniform distribution with a [0;1]6 support. : The parameters ps and pu are


























c). We generate 10,000 such samples. Denote E (￿) as the set of all such
10,000 economies. We then create a subset of these sample economies (call it E (￿p)) such
that ps > pu ￿b and it is socially optimal for the planner to intervene and mandate that
at least one party should bear the cost of job training. In view of Lemma 7 , such a set
of economies is given by:
17E (￿p) = fE (￿) : r(0;0) < min(r(1;0);(1;1);r(0;1))g
Given the set of economies where the planner ￿nds it optimal to intervene in job
training, we next construct two subsets economies as follows:





E(￿2) = fE (￿) : r(0;0) < min(r(1;0);(1;1);r(0;1))g;sc > sc
n￿
w g
We next compute three probabilities: (i) the probability that the planner will intervene
in the training market, (ii) Given that the social planner asks at least party to invest in
job training, none invest, (iii) Given that the social planner asks worker to pay, the worker














where the # stands for the number of elements in the relevant set.
Table 1 plots each of these three probabilities against ￿ values ￿xing
￿
ps = 10 and
￿
pu = 1:1: This basically means that on the average the high skilled sector produces
about 5 times more output than low skilled sector. In economies with a lower rate of
time preference the probability of market failure is higher although the social planner￿ s
18intervention is nearly the same. Shortsighted private agents will care less for job training
which boosts their future earning.
Table 1
￿ .96 .90 .86 .80
Prob1 .96 .96 .95 .94
Prob2 .35 .49 .57 .65
Prob3 .37 .51 .60 .69
In Table 2, we plot the same probabilities for di⁄erent values of
￿
ps ￿xing ￿ = :96: The
probability of market failure is higher if the average output di⁄erential between the high
skilled and low skilled sector is less.
Table 2
￿
ps 10 8 6 4 2
Prob1 .96 .96 .95 .94 .92
Prob2 .34 .36 .38 .41 .44
Prob3 .36 .39 .40 .44 .46
Figure 1 presents the class of economies in terms of initial distribution of skill where the
social planner intervenes. The social planner appears to intervene for all ranges of initial
distribution of skill which suggests that it is socially bene￿cial to invest in job training
regardless of the initial con￿guration of the economy. Figure 2 presents the distribution
of economies where the planner does not intervene for a range of economies classi￿ed in
terms of the degree of labour market friction in the low-skilled sector. Notice that the
social planner wishes not to intervene in economies mostly in economies with very low
degree of labour market frictions (￿u): Figure 3 depicts the ￿rst scenario of market failure
where the social planner mandates that at least one party should pay for job training
but neither likes to pay. Figure 4 plots the second scenario of market failure where the
planner mandates that the worker should pay but the worker refuses. Both these ￿gures
suggest that the likelihood of such market failures is less in economies which are populated
initially by a larger number of skilled workers and ￿rms. In other words, the chance of
19market failure dramatically increases in economies with high initial inequality in the skill
distribution.
<Figures 1 through 4 come here>
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to explain two apparently con￿ icting stylized facts in the UK
labour market. First, there is an acute skill shortage in the UK economy. High skilled
positions remain vacant for a long time while there is an excess supply of intermediate
skills. Second, there exists a substantial high to low skill premium. There is unexploited
pro￿t opportunity in the high skilled sector while neither the worker nor the ￿rm appear
to take advantage of these through job training. We propose an explanation of this
anomaly in terms of a coordination failure of ￿rm￿ s and worker￿ s decisions regarding job
training. Our model demonstrates that while it is socially optimal to invest in job training,
the private sector may not internalize this bene￿t. There could be underinvestment or
possibly no investment in training. Such a coordination failure in job training is a
distinct possibility in a range of economies which have high inequality in the initial skill
distribution. This gives rise to the question whether the government should step in with
an agenda of active public policy to correct this market failure. In order to come to a
de￿nitive answer to this policy question, one needs to model public policy taking into
consideration of the government budget constraint.
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(￿uw ￿ uu) = (￿uf ￿ vu) or vu = uu ￿
￿
￿uw ￿ ￿uf￿
= uu ￿ ￿
u; where ￿
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where ￿u = ￿u



























Conjecture a solution ￿uw = ￿uf = 0: Since 0 ￿ uu ￿ ￿uw and 0 ￿ vu ￿ ￿uf this














are satis￿ed as well.























is the equilibrium mismatch between high-skilled workers and

































In the steady state, from (2.6)
4￿
sf
t = 0 (7.35)
which implies that ￿sf = ￿s
0 and ￿uf = ￿u
0











t ￿ 0. If the equality holds uu = 0: If the strict inequality holds,￿sw
t
approaches the upper limit which means ￿uw
t approaches zero. Since uu
t ￿ ￿uw
t , this means
that uu
t also approaches zero. Thus the solution is uu = 0:
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Again as in Lemma 1, conjecture that ￿uw = (1 ￿ ￿sw) = ￿uf = 1 ￿ ￿sf = 0: Then
















































is the equilibrium mismatch between high-skilled workers and













23Proof of Lemma 4: Using (2.7) and (2.6) ￿sf=￿s
0and ￿sw = ￿s
0 do not change and
are given by initial conditions. Using (2.4) and (2.2) we have (￿s
0 ￿ us) = (￿s
0 ￿ vs) or
















Similarly using (2.5) and (2.3) we have (￿u
0 ￿ uu) = (￿u


















Suppose the ￿rm is not paying then ￿


















00 = ￿(pu + cu) + (1 ￿ ￿)b: If the worker starts paying i.e. ￿
w = 1 we have
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Figure 1: Distribution of economies where planner intervenes











Figure 2: Distribution of economies where planner does not intervene










Figure 3: Distribution of economies where nobody paying when at least one should pay















Figure 4: Distribution of economies where worker not paying when the worker should pay
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